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Debra Plato
Deputy Clerk
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Court Reporter

Attorneys Present for Plaintiffs:

Attorneys Present for Defendants:

Not Present

Not Present

Proceedings:

(In Chambers) Order GRANTING in part and DENYING in part
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Complaint (Docket No. 14)
I. INTRODUCTION

Defendant CBS Interactive is the owner and operator of Defendant corporation
CNET Networks, Inc. (Mot. Dismiss 4.) CNET is a website network that specializes in
information about technology, software, and consumer electronics. (Id. 3.) One of the
websites in CNET’s network is download.com, which provides its users with download
links for third-party software that is submitted by the software publishers. (Id.)
Hundreds of thousands of products are accessible on download.com, including peer-topeer (P2P) file-sharing software. (Id. 4.)
Based upon allegations that Defendants distributed P2P software that was used to
infringe copyrights, Plaintiffs brought suit, asserting claims for (1) vicarious copyright
infringement, (2) contributory infringement, and (3) inducement of infringement. (Id. 5;
Pls.’ Complaint ¶ 2.) Beyond allegations that Defendants distributed P2P software,
Plaintiffs also allege that Defendants published articles, videos, and reviews that
encouraged users to download copyrighted material with the available P2P software.
(Pls.’ Complaint ¶ 10.)
Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss, seeking to dismiss all claims. (Docket No.
14.)
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows an attack on the pleadings for
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failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. “[W]hen ruling on a defendant’s
motion to dismiss, a judge must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in
the complaint.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). However, allegations
contradicted by matters properly subject to judicial notice or by exhibit need not be
accepted as true, Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001);
and a court is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual
allegation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks
omitted). “Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertion[s] devoid of further
factual enhancement.” Id. (alteration in original; internal quotation marks omitted). A
complaint must “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). This means that the complaint must plead “factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “The plausibility standard is not
akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a
defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. Ruling on a motion to dismiss will be “a contextspecific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and
common sense. But where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more
than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged – but it has not
show[n] – that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (alteration in
original; internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
“Normally, when a viable case may be pled, a district court should freely grant
leave to amend.” Cafasso v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., 637 F.3d 1047, 1058 (9th Cir.
2011).
III. DISCUSSION
A.

Vicarious Copyright Infringement

To state a claim for vicarious copyright infringement, a plaintiff must allege that
the defendant is (1) profiting from the direct infringement, and (2) declining to exercise a
right and ability to stop the infringement. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v.
Grokster, Ltd. 545 U.S. 913, 930 (2005) (Grokster); see also Perfect-10, Inc. v. Visa Int’l
Serv., Ass’n, 494 F.3d 788, 802 (9th Cir. 2007) (Perfect-10 Visa). Vicarious liability
doctrine arises from the principles of respondeat superior, and focuses on the degree of
direct control that the defendant has over the directly infringing party. Perfect-10 Visa,
494 F.3d at 802-03. Defendant must have more than just an opportunity to control the
infringement, they must have a legal right to do so. Id. (“[T]he mere ability to withdraw
a financial ‘carrot’ does not create the ‘stick’ of ‘right and ability’ that vicarious
infringement requires.”); see also Perfect-10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146,
1173 (9th Cir. 2007) (Perfect-10 Amazon).
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In Perfect-10 Amazon, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a vicarious
copyright infringement claim against an internet search engine because it had neither a
contractual nor implied right to “stop direct infringement by third-party websites,”
despite its ability to control its index, search results, and web pages. 508 F.3d at 117374. Even though the search engine’s policies stated that it reserved “the right to monitor
and terminate partnerships with entities that violate others’ copyright[s],” the Ninth
Circuit affirmed that the search engine did not have the right to stop direct infringement
by third party web sites, because the web site could continue to infringe copyrights even
after the partnership was terminated. Id.
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a vicarious infringement
claim against companies that provided payment services to third-party file-sharing
websites in Perfect-10 Visa, 494 F.3d at 802-03. The necessary level of control was not
established because, “[d]efendants cannot take away the software the offending websites
use to copy, alter, and distribute the infringing images, cannot remove those websites
from the internet, and cannot themselves block the distribution of those images over the
internet.” Id. at 805. Though the companies had the right to deny their services, “and
hence, the literal power to ‘stop or limit’ the infringement, they . . . do not exercise
sufficient control over the actual infringing activity for vicarious liability to attach.” Id.
at 806.
Here, Plaintiffs do not sufficiently allege that Defendants have the ability to control
the direct infringement. If Defendants removed the links to P2P software from their site,
infringing third-parties would not be prevented from seeking the software out elsewhere
and continuing to pirate copyrighted music. Defendants control whether infringing thirdparties can access the P2P software through their site, but do not have the right to stop
users from using the software to download copyrighted material illegally. Similar to the
search engine in Perfect-10 Amazon, Defendants exercise control over their index and
search results, curating the programs available through their services. This does not
equate to control over direct infringement.
Because Plaintiffs fail to allege that Defendants had the right and ability to control
the direct infringement, the Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED as to the vicarious
copyright infringement claim.
B.

Contributory Copyright Infringement

Traditionally, a party who “induces, causes or materially contributes to the
infringing conduct of another,” and who has knowledge of the infringing conduct, may be
held liable for contributory infringement. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d
1004, 1019 (9th Cir. 2001) (Napster). In Grokster, the Supreme Court identified two
variations on contributory liability: “Liability under our jurisprudence may be predicated
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on actively encouraging (or inducing) infringement through specific acts . . . or on
distributing a product distributees use to infringe copyrights, if the product is not capable
of ‘substantial’ or ‘commercially significant’ non-infringing uses.” 545 U.S. at 942
(Ginsburg, J., concurring). The Ninth Circuit has further attempted to articulate the basic
test, distinguishing the variations as situations in which the defendant either (1)
materially contributes to the infringement, or (2) induces the infringement. Perfect-10
Visa, 494 F.3d at 795.
1.

Material Contribution

Stating a claim under the material contribution theory of contributory liability
requires allegations that defendant knew or should have known of specific infringing
material. Napster, 239 F.3d at 1020-21 (9th Cir. 2001). Knowledge cannot be imputed to
a defendant merely because it is distributing a product that is used for purposes of
infringement, if the product is “capable of substantial noninfringing uses.” Sony Corp. of
Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984) (“the sale of copying
equipment, like the sale of other articles of commerce, does not constitute contributory
infringement if the product is widely used for legitimate, unobjectionable purposes.”); see
also Napster, 239 F.3d at 1021.
Defendants contend that Napster requires actual knowledge of specific
infringements, relying on the statement, “absent any specific information which identifies
infringing activity, a computer system operator cannot be liable for contributory
infringement merely because the structure of the system allows for the exchange of
copyrighted material.” Id. But the Ninth Circuit did not discard constructive knowledge
as a sufficient basis for contributory liability. It simply found that it need not address
constructive knowledge. Following Sony, the court declined to impose liability based
solely on defendant Napster’s P2P software, instead basing liability on Napster’s conduct
with respect to the use of that software. Id. at 1020 (“We are compelled to make a clear
distinction between the architecture of the Napster system and Napster’s conduct in
relation to the operational capacity of the system.”). The Ninth Circuit determined that
liability could be imposed because Napster had “actual knowledge that specific
infringing material [was] available using its system.” Id. at 1022; see also id. at 1022, n.
6 (“[D]efendant had actual notice of direct infringement because the RIAA informed it of
more than 12,000 infringing files.”).
In Perfect-10 Amazon, the court upheld the Napster test, re-emphasizing that the
knowledge be of specific infringing material. 508 F.3d at 1172 (“Applying our test,
Google could be held contributorily liable if it had knowledge that infringing Perfect 10
images were available using its search engine, could take simple measures to prevent
further damage to Perfect 10’s copyrighted works, and failed to take such steps.”); see
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also Sony, 464 U.S. at 446 (“[I]n an action for contributory infringement . . . the
copyright holder may not prevail unless the relief that he seeks affects only his programs,
or unless he speaks for virtually all copyright holders with an interest in the outcome.”).
Along with knowledge of specific infringing material, the plaintiffs must also
allege that the defendant materially contributed to the infringing conduct. Perfect-10
Visa, 494 F.3d at 796. A party materially contributes to copyright infringement if the
infringing activity would be substantially more difficult without that party’s services.
Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 264 (9th Cir. 1996). Alleging that a
defendant provided the “sites and facilities” for the infringement is adequate to plead
material contribution. See id.; Napster, 239 F.3d at 1022. In Napster, Napster materially
contributed because its users could not “find and download the music they want with . . .
ease” in the absence of Napster’s services. 239 F.3d at 1022. Likewise, in Fonovisa, a
swap meet operator was found contributorily liable for the sale of pirated music at a swap
meet because it “actively strive[d] to provide the environment and the market for
counterfeit recording sales to thrive.” 76 F.3d at 264. Conversely, in Perfect-10 Visa,
defendant credit card companies did not materially contribute to third-party infringement
because the plaintiff did not allege that the infringing material passed over the
defendants’ networks, that defendants’ networks were used to alter or display the
infringing images, or that the defendants helped locate or distribute infringing material.
Here too, Plaintiffs fail to allege that Defendants had knowledge sufficient to state
a claim for contributory liability. Though the Ninth Circuit did not preclude constructive
knowledge as a basis for material contribution in Napster as Defendants here assert, it did
not delineate what constitutes constructive knowledge in a contributory liability claim,
focusing instead on Napster’s actual knowledge. Regardless, Plaintiffs do not allege that
Defendants had knowledge - actual or constructive - of specific works of the Plaintiffs.
Allegations that Defendants had knowledge that the overarching purpose of the P2P
software was piracy are not enough to satisfy the knowledge standard laid out by the
Ninth Circuit in Napster. Unlike Napster, where defendant Napster had been notified of
12,000 specific infringing files, Plaintiffs make no claim that Defendants had specific
knowledge of their copyrighted works being infringed by users of their services. Though
Plaintiffs allege that CNET’s editors compared different P2P products using specific
copyrighted songs of non-parties, Plaintiffs do not assert any specific examples of
infringement of Plaintiffs’ works. Plaintiffs do not allege that Defendants were notified
of specific infringement of Plaintiffs’ copyrights, nor that they had the ability to learn of
such infringement.
Further, Plaintiffs do not adequately allege that Defendants materially contributed
to the infringing conduct. Although Plaintiffs allege that Defendants’ distribution of the
P2P software is a material contribution, no copyrighted material is available through
Defendants’ website. Instead, a potential infringer can only download the P2P software.
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The courts have yet to find contributory liability based on a tertiary actor’s conduct. In
Fonovisa, the infringing material was located in and traded at the defendant’s market. In
Napster, Napster’s services allowed users to locate and download copyrighted material.
In both instances, the defendant’s service allowed for a user to directly infringe on
copyrights. Here, Defendants’ services do not allow for direct infringement, as
Defendants do not provide the “site and facilities” for users to find copyrighted material.
Like Perfect-10 Visa, the Defendants’ services are not used to distribute infringing
materials. The P2P software on Defendants’ website was not developed by Defendants,
is not maintained by them, and is accessible elsewhere on the internet.
The test that has been reiterated by the Ninth Circuit requires knowledge of
specific infringements first. Next, the defendant must be able to take simple steps to stop
the infringement. Here, even if knowledge could be properly alleged, Defendants could
not take simple steps to stop the infringement. Though Defendants could remove the P2P
software from their website, they cannot disable the software that has already been
downloaded, and cannot prevent future infringement.
Because Plaintiffs fail to allege both that Defendants had the requisite knowledge
and that Defendants materially contributed to the direct infringement, the Motion to
Dismiss this count is GRANTED.
2. Inducement
Stating a claim under the “inducement” variation of contributory copyright
infringement requires a plaintiff to plead that defendants distributed a device “with the
object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other
affirmative steps taken to foster infringement.” Grokster, 545 U.S. at 936-37. The
plaintiff must allege that the defendant had more than just knowledge of actual or
potential infringement. Id. at 937. Liability is premised on “purposeful, culpable
expression and conduct.” Id. (“The classic instance of inducement is by advertisement or
solicitation that broadcasts a message designed to stimulate others to commit
violations.”); see also id. at 941 (“If liability for inducing infringement is ultimately
found, it will not be on the basis of presuming or imputing fault, but from inferring a
patently illegal objective from statements and actions showing what that objective was.”).
Further, the inducement theory requires “evidence of actual infringement by recipients of
the device.” Id. at 940. In Grokster, the Supreme Court found that the defendants’
“unlawful objective was unmistakable” because, along with distributing their own P2P
software, they also advertised the software’s ability to access copyrighted music, and
presented themselves as an alternative to Napster. Id. at 937-940.
Here, Plaintiffs properly state a claim for inducement. Plaintiffs allege that
Defendants distributed several P2P programs, and reviewed the programs in relation to
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other P2P programs known for copyright infringement, such as Napster and Limewire.
(Pls.’ Complaint ¶ 121-24.) Plaintiffs also allege that Defendants posted videos to their
websites demonstrating how to use specific P2P programs by searching for songs by
copyrighted artists, and posted articles and how-to guides that included references to
Napster, Limewire, and downloading copyrighted material. (Id. ¶ 127-144). Defendants
contend that an inducement theory of liability requires allegations that specific files have
been infringed. However, the case law does not support this contention.
Defendants contend that imposing liability under an inducement theory would
infringe their First Amendment rights, as the subject videos and articles are merely
opinions. They point to other well-known websites that allegedly offer similar
commentary on P2P software. However, Defendants here are alleged to have distributed
specific P2P software, while simultaneously providing explicit commentary on that
software’s effectiveness in infringing copyright. Such behavior moves beyond opinion
into the realm of conduct and does not directly implicate any First Amendment issues.
Defendants’ argument that a finding of inducement in this case would make it
difficult to counsel future parties on the proper boundaries of editorial content is greatly
overstated. This is not a particularly close or challenging case for inducement based on
the facts alleged. Here, Defendants are alleged to have taken the unusual and ill-advised
steps of distributing software programs that are capable of widespread copyright
infringement while simultaneously demonstrating how to infringe copyrights using that
software and evaluating the various programs as to their effectiveness in copying
copyrighted material. As noted above, inducement liability requires (1) distribution (2)
“with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression
or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement.” Grokster, 545 U.S. at 936-37. It
would not be difficult to avoid liability by either (1) only providing editorial content
without distributing the software or (2) distributing the software without demonstrating or
advocating its use for violating copyrights. The Court is confident that most reasonable
parties could find their way to accomplish their general goals without running afoul of
inducement liability.
Because Plaintiffs properly state a claim under the inducement theory of
contributory liability, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss this count is DENIED.
C.

Failure to Allege Copyright Registration.

In order to claim secondary infringement of copyright, Plaintiffs must allege
primary infringement. Grokster, 545 U.S. at 940. Allegation of a registered copyright is
an element of a copyright infringement claim. See Cosmetic Ideas, Inc. v.
IAC/Interactive Corp., 606 F.3d 612, 615 (9th Cir. 2010).
Here, Plaintiffs filed a Form AO-121 listing the registered works at issue in this
CV-90 (12/02)

MEMORANDUM

Page 7 of 8

Case 2:11-cv-09437-DSF-JC Document 28

Filed 07/13/12 Page 8 of 8 Page ID #:412

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
MEMORANDUM
action. However, nineteen listed Plaintiffs do not hold any of the copyrights listed on the
form. The Motion to Dismiss as to these Plaintiffs is GRANTED.
IV. CONCLUSION
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is DENIED as to the inducement claim. The
Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED as to the vicarious liability claim and the material
contribution theory of contributory liability claim. Further, the Motion to Dismiss is
GRANTED as to the nineteen Plaintiffs who have failed to make a claim to ownership of
a copyrighted work. The counts are dismissed with leave to amend consistent with this
Order. An amended complaint must be filed and served no later than July 25, 2012.
Failure to file by that date will waive Plaintiffs’ right to do so. Leave to amend is granted
only where specifically identified and only to address the issues raised in the motion.
The Court does not grant leave to add new defendants or new claims. Leave to add
defendants or claims must be sought by a separate, properly noticed motion. If Plaintiffs
fail to amend, Defendants must answer the Complaint no later than August 15, 2012.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
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